Making his first official trip to Europe, Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi visited France, Germany and Canada in early April this
year. His agenda: acquiring Rafale fighter jets, boosting Indian
manufacturing through the Make in India campaign, urging the EU to move
forward on a stalled free trade agreement, and attracting trade and
investment.
Although Modi has
said
that he “usually tries to visit two to four nations together” in
convenient clusters, the U.K. was not on his itinerary, despite some
vigorous courting. While Britain has erected a statue of Mahatma Gandhi
in London’s Parliament Square in an attempt to entice India, the former
colonial power finds itself on the sidelines.
In 2014, five prominent U.K. politicians made official visits to
India, from former Foreign Secretary William Hague to Chancellor of the
Exchequer George Osborne and former Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg.
Indeed, Prime Minister David Cameron himself has visited India a
whooping three times since assuming office in 2010, including twice in
2013,
professing
that India is Britain’s “partner of choice” and “relations with India
are at the top of the U.K.’s foreign policy priorities.” In 2012,
Britain was among the first countries to withdraw its boycott of Modi
over his alleged complicity in the 2002 Gujarat riots – the U.S. only
followed suit in 2014. In addition, Britain has steadily
supported India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Yet, the traffic has been largely one way, and interestingly, no
Indian prime minister has visited the UK since Atal Bihari Vajpayee in
2001, barring Manmohan Singh’s attendance at the 2009 G-20 Summit in
London, which naturally did not focus on the bilateral; and
notwithstanding Finance Minister Arun Jaitley’s recent March visit to
London, few Indian officials have done so.
With the U.K. increasingly moving away from the limited colonial
outlook that exemplified its view of India in earlier decades, what
explains New Delhi’s indifferent response towards London’s overtures,
and the U.K.’s relegation in India’s political, economic, and
international calculations?
Despite a deep historical legacy, cultural bonds bridging centuries, a
prominent Indian diaspora numbering 2 million, strong educational ties,
$15.8 billion in trade in favor of India, and a strong economic
relationship with major investments on both sides, Britain is among a
host of nations hoping to capitalize on India’s flourishing economy and
the opening of its burgeoning defense industry to foreign investment
through which it can possibly carve a role for itself in Asia and
feature more prominently in the region. As the
Economist notes, “Today everyone wants to be best pals with India.”
Diminishing Britain’s influence is potent competition from the
exporting states of Japan, France and Germany, which have each created
an efficient niche. The U.K.’s attempts to tap into India’s budding
defense industry have been impeded by India’s diversification of defense
sources, including its widespread military links with France – boosted
by the latter’s refusal to condemn India’s 1998 nuclear tests – and the
U.K.’s failure to secure the sale of its Eurofighter Typhoon jets, with
India
opting
for the lower cost French Dassault Rafaele jets instead, making France
India’s largest European defense partner. (The U.K.’s offer of its
Eurofighter jets to India has been recently
renewed
by Cameron, who claims that his deal is better.) German industrial
expertise can contribute to India’s development and infrastructure
projects including rail networks and smart cities, as
reiterated
by Steinruecke of the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce. Japanese
technology, investments, and aid in India’s infrastructure projects,
including the construction of smart cities, Delhi’s mass rapid transit
system, and the Delhi-Mumbai industrial corridor, plans to further
defense and security cooperation, not least to counter Chinese
aggression, in return for rejuvenation of its moribund economy through
exports and investments to a rapidly flourishing India, have paved the
way for a promising partnership.
Despite Cameron’s latest
assertion
that Britain is a better partner for Modi’s Make in India campaign, in
comparison to the likes of Germany and Japan, the U.K. appears to have
comparatively little of an exclusive or a unique nature to offer India.
Certainly, India can benefit from Britain’s impressive historical
expertise and know-how in technology and innovation. Additionally, a
large number of British firms operate in India, not least Vodafone,
Unilever, Diageo, and British American Tobacco. Indian firms
prefer Britain for FDI, and
British banks lend more to India
than any other country. But while countries like Japan and Germany have
been eager to invest in India’s growing economy and the large number of
infrastructure projects, the U.K. has been more
reluctant
to do so, including plans to invest in India’s ambitious 1,000 km
Mumbai-Bangalore corridor. Strategic cooperation between India and
Britain is being strengthened, especially in the realms of
counter-terrorism and civil nuclear cooperation. However, the U.K. has
concurrently
pressed for a bigger role for Pakistan in Afghanistan, continuing its historic
pro-Pakistan incline – something that naturally does not sit well with India.
Clearly, India’s foreign policy focus has shifted to the
Indo-Pacific, yet even within Europe, Britain has been consigned to the
backburner. Though the relationship between the two countries will
likely continue to be affable and mutually constructive, and substantial
economic, strategic and military gains will be achieved for both sides,
Britain will not be India’s only reciprocal “partner of choice” as
Cameron wishes, and it is far-fetched to think ties can develop into a
“special relationship.”
Far from writer Patrick French’s critique of Britain’s narrow-minded
colonial mindset and its subsequent incapability to fathom how India is
growing, Britain’s recent attitude exhibits a pragmatic necessity and
appreciation of engaging with a rising India. India’s reactions are also
characterized by pragmatic reflections, including an acknowledgement of
Britain’s fading international clout. In the transactional and
ephemeral world of international relations, historical links and shared
values matter, but ultimately the future of the relationship will depend
on India’s evaluation of what it derives from the ties. This will
determine where Britain stands on India’s radar and how much political
weight India is willing to invest to deepen the level of engagement.
Overall, the evolving Indo-British relationship reflects shifting
geopolitical realities, including a significant change in the global
balance of power, a multipolar world in which India is an emerging
power, and a Britain that is no longer the great power it once was.